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Two issues raised by the behaviour of wage-maximising cooperative or 
labour-managed firms (LMFs) are addressed: the insensitivity of
firms' equilibrium to the supply price of labour or to the centrally
imposed calculated wage, which prevents the labour market to clear;
the firms' sluggish if not negative output response to demand shifts, 
which provokes inflationary pressures but also harms LMFs' ability to 
compete against flexibly adapting profit-maximising firms. The paper 
proposes an automatic transfer mechanism which induces worker
cooperatives to react to changes in their parameters with equal or 
greater intensity than the conventional profit maximisers.
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The traditional Illyrian theory of labour-management (Ward, 1958; 
Domar, 1966; Vanek, 1970; Meade, 1972) identifies the labour-managed 
or cooperative firm with an enterprise run by its workers who equally 
share in firm's income and collectively set firm's policies so as to 
maximise the income per unit of employed labour, which may also be 
labelled full wage or dividend.
It is well understood that such a maximisation strategy will have 
negative implications for the functioning of a labour-managed economy, 
which appears to markedly differ from that of a system composed of
entrepreneurial profit-maximising firms. Three problems, linked to a 
firm's short-run behaviour, are usually mentioned: the failure of the
labour market to clear (Ward, 1958; Vanek, 1970); the suboptimal 
allocation of employed social labour (Domar, 1966; Bergson, 1967); the 
firms' sluggish or even negative output response to demand shifts 
(Ward, 1958; Domar, 1966; Steinherr and Thjsse, 1979; Bonin and 
Fukuda, 1986), which is likely to generafe strong inflationary
pressures but also handicaps LMFs in the competition against 
conventional flexibly adapting profit-maximising firms (Montias,
1986),
The short-run behaviour of a cooperative firm provided therefore 
the focus for much of the analysis of labour-management and several
recipes how to correct the detected anomalies emerged. Generally, the 
advanced proposals may be classified in two groups.
One group consists of solutions that combine some innovative 
institutional arrangements with the initially defined principles of 
worker-management (Meade, 1972; Bonin, 1981; Sertel, 1982; Miyazaki 
and Neary, 1983). Another class comprises corrective mechanisms that 
aim to remain within the original institutional design of the 
labour-managed enterprise (Ireland and Law, 1978; Thomson, 1982; 
Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984).
The present scheme falls in the second category but differs from 
the existing proposals in that it scales down the quest for allocative 
efficiency. In return, it puts a stronger emphasis on a firm's 




























































































most serious problems of labour-management.
I he outline of the paper is as follows. The presentation of the 
mechanism appears in part 2. Its impact on the LMFs' equilibrium is 
identified in part 3. In part 4 the functioning of the labour market 
is studied. In part 5 a firm's supply behaviour, induced by the 
mechanism, is analysed. Summary and conclusions are left for part 6.
In designing the scheme two modelling options are adopted: the 
principle of automatic control of a firm's behaviour, and the labour 
market with an auctioneer.
2. The Transfer Mechanism
The firm uses a fixed non-depreciating capital stock of value X and 
homogeneous labour L to produce output X via production function 
X = X(l), characterised with U-shaped average variable costs shedule. 
it sells competitively at a price p and pays parametric rental r X,
where r  is the current rate of interest. The firm's income is
Y = (pX -  rX), with y = Y/L and u = Y/K being, respectively, the
income per worker or dividend, and the income per unit of invested 
capital, which will be called the rate of income.
It is the maximisation of the per capita y that is responsible for
the listed deficiencies of worker-management.
Suppose now that, in responding to the problems observed, the 
cooperative authorities establish an incentive fund. The Fund defines 
the calculated wage or the tax exemption v, setting at the same time 
the minimum income per worker or the minimum wage y = wD, at which the 
firm is either shut down or taken over by the Fund. The (calculated) 
profit emerging from this procedure amounts to n = (Y -  wL) with 
it = (y -  w) being the profit per worker.
The Fund then levies an allocation tax on profitable firms, 
subsidising at the same time those that are making losses, where the 
transfer rate t depends on a firm's rate of income u. The complete 
schedule of transfer rates is defined by the following continiously 
twice differentiable function in u: 1




























































































(2) e_ u _  d (l - 1)1 - t du
where e represents a parameter of the t function, identified with the 
elasticity of a transfer complement with respect to a firm's rate of 
income, and hereafter referred to as the allocation parameter.
The implementation of the above mechanism makes the (after 
transfer) dividend the following continiously twice differentiable 
function in L:
(3) z = w + n(l - t)
In what follows we shall call z simply the dividend, and will 
reserve the term "income per worker” to denote the before transfer 
magnitude y1.
Now, the first and second order conditions for the maximum of z 
reduce to:
(4) PX' = ; .  = n-
(5) z- = (1 - t ) lp L X " ( 1 + es)___+ en(l - e3 + 2es) I < ()
L 2 (1 + e s ) 2
£  0
where X' and X" are the first and the second derivative of X(L).
We shall refer to the labour-managed firm that follows the 
allocation rule of (4) as to the controlled LMF, or simply LMF, and 
will associate the term "Illyrian firm" with the uncontrolled
behaviour of an untaxed or neutrally taxed cooperative.
3. Mqving the Firm's Equilibrium
Throughout this section we assume that the I.MF sells at a same price 





























































































We first have to ensure the positivity of the LMF's value marginal 
product of labour iu (4), when profits are negative:
(6) 1 + es > 0 ;
This reduces to:
(7) e < £  - 1
If (7) holds at the shut down level of n (= w0- w), it will hold a 
f o r t i o r i  for any greater algebraic value of this function. Hence, a 
restriction on e is:
n
w + n
(7a) L‘ < (w Zw J T l
We can now proceed by examining the sensitivity of the LMF's 
equilibrium to changes in the e parametar. We differentiate (4) with 
respect to e to obtain, di|e to (6) and (5):
(»)
dL
a ?  -
-ïï(| + es)
pl.X"(l  + es) + en(l - e3 + 2es)
< 0 n < o
This may be summarised by the following proposition:
PI.  A change in the e parameter to the LHF leads to a change in its 
employment (and output) in the same (opposite) direction when profits 
positive (negative)
The question raised by PI is to what extent the LMF's equilibrium 
employment (and output) can be influenced by manipulating the e 
parameter. To examine this, we set the PMF's optimum employment as a 
standard of comparison, and write down its first order condition for 
the maximum profit:




























































































We then ask whether the LMF can be induced to achieve greater 
(smaller) equilibrium employment and output than the PMF, when profits 
are positive (negative). Given the technological assumptions, a
desired outcome will be ensured if between (4) and (9) the following
relation holds:
(1") ----- > w *  n < 0' ' 1 + es
Taking account of the identity relations y = w  + n and s = ir/(w + n), 
equation (10) reduces to the requirement:
(11) e > 1 + m ; m = —
We now impose:
(12) e = 1 + m* > 1
where m is some m unlikely to be attained, in a specified time
period, by uncontrolled LMFs. In what follows we assume that (7a) is 
not binding on (12)2.
Equation (12) leads to the following proposition on the LMF's 
equilibrium employment and output:
P2. Faced with a same product price and with same labour and capital
costs the LHF employs more (less) workers and produces more (less)
output than the PMF, when profits are positive (negative)
4. The Effects of a Change in Calculated Wage
It is a well-known property of the Illyrian firm that it is
insensitive to variations in the institutionally imposed labour cost 
or the calculated wage. This leaves the centre without dn instrument 
that would be naturally suited to cope with the rigidities of the 
Illyrian labour market. It is therefore of interest to establish





























































































4.1 The Wage Employment Kesporise arici the Collection 
of Demand fur labour S c h e d u l e s
In examine the I MF's employment reaction to a change in the calculated 
wage, we replace n with (y - w) in (4), and differentiate the equation 
with respect to w to obtain:
which, in the limit, displays the Illyrian zero reaction (e = 0).
Outside this limit, applying (6) and (5) to (13), it appears that the 
following proposition oh the IM F ’ s sensitivity to variations in the 
standard labour costs holds:
|>3. A change in the calculated wage to the LML leads to a change in Its 
demand for labour in the opposite direct ion
Thus P3, which describes movements along a demand for labour curve 
generated by a given value of the e parameter, shows this curve to be 
negatively sloped in w .
At the same time P2 and PI, combined with P3, imply that in the 
relevant interval of the e parameter, defined by (12) and (7a), there 
exists an infinite number of negatively sloped demand for labour 
curves. Some of these curves are depicted in figure 1, where 
VMPl (=  pX') and y denote the value-marginal-product-of-labour and the 
income-per-worker schedule, respectively.
4.2 Clearing tl\e Labour Market under Uorker-Management
It now appears that the defined mechanism makes calculated wage the 
instrument for clearing the labour market in a cooperative economy, 
provided the same occurs in the twin entrepreneurial system.
Thus, in the case of a fixed aggregate labour supply, the centre 
will gradually increase e until it generates the aggregate demand for
(1 3 )
pLX"(l  + es)  + en(l - e 3 + 2es)
eL(l + es)




























































































labour curve which intersects the aggregate labour supply schedule at 
least at the point of the minimum calculated wage v , ,  defined in part 
2. Of course, if the corresponding value of the e parameter still 
falls short of the magnitude required by P2 and defined in (12), the 
centre will continue to increase e until it reaches this magnitude.
It emerges however that the centre will also be able to clear the 
labour market in an economy with elastic labour supply. In order for 
the proper employment equilibrium to be ensured in this case, the 
labour supply should not be decreasing in calculated wage. Suppose now 
that the information on the current value of the dividend is public3, 
which implies that the aggregate labour supply is increasing in z of 
(3). But the differentiation of (3) with respect to w gives:
(1 4 )  »  * >  0
We therefore conclude that the following proposition on the 
sensitivity of labour supply holds:
P 4 .  A change in the calculated wage In an economy populated with LMFs 
leads to a change In the aggregate labour supply In the same direction
At the same time, changes in the allocation parameter will have no 
impact on the labour supply schedule as a function of v, since the 
differentiation of (3) with respect to e exactly yields:
(is) a f  = o
It follows that, similar to the case of a fixed labour supply, the 
centre can start the adjustment process by gradually increasing the 
allocation parameter. This will lead to anti-clockwise "rotation" of 
the aggregate demand curve for labour until it intersects the 
aggregate labour supply schedule at the point equal to or greater than 
the minimum calculated wage.
Thus, by selecting the appropriate value of the e parameter and 
acting as an auctioneer in the labour market the centre will, both in 




























































































(unique') market clearing calculated wage which, at the same time, will 
nut (all short of its critical magnitude, determined by the minimum 
lax exemption.
V. The Effects of a Change in Product Price
Proposition 2 implies that, at least in some price interval, the LMF 
will have the normal (positive) employment and output response to a 
change in the product price. However, a more definite conclusion on 
the IM F 's  supply behaviour can be reached. In order to do this, we 
differentiate (4) with respect to p, to obtain:
( 16) dl.
dp
(I  + es) I rK + e ( rK + wL - 2rK s) l  
p lp l .X " ( l  + e s )  + e n ( 1  - e3 + 2 e s) l
Due to (6) and (5) it is seen that the positive employment (and 
output) response is consistent with the negativity of the square 
bracketed term of the numerator, i. e., with the following condition:
(17) e > a
where:
(1K) “ = 1 + (wL/rK) - 2s
Since e is already established to be greater than unity, in the 
region of negative profits (17) holds, which ensures the positive 
employment reaction by the l.MF.
To establish the algebraic sign of (16) in the region of




dp wrK I +
__2 rKes IdL
Y (1 + es) J3 p
Let p0 be the price at which s  = 0. Note also that at pQ (17) holds, 




























































































since a is continiously differentiable in p there always must exist 
some interval [p0, p , )  where (17) holds and where, due to the
consequential positiveness of dL/dp, a is monotonically decreasing in 
p. Suppose now that a reaches the minimum at p , , i.e., that da/dp is
equal to zero. But it is seen from (19) that, with s and Y being 
positive, this can only happen if dL/dp is equal to zero. However, at 
p, (17) holds, and dL/dp is strictly positive. Hence a does not have a 
minimum at p , . The infinite repetition of the argument reveals that a
does not have a minimum in the entire region of nonnegative profits,
i. e., that it is monotonically decreasing in p in this interval.
We therefore conclude that the following proposition on the LMF's 
response to price variations will generally hold:
P5. A change in the product price to the LMF leads to a change in its 
employment and output in the same direction*
At the same time P5, combined with P2, indicates that, at least in
the large and most relevant segment of the price region, which
encompasses the zero-profits price point, the controlled LMF will 
adapt to demand shifts more flexibly than the entrepreneurial PMF, in 
the sense that its product supply curve will be less steep than the 
corresponding PMF’ s schedule.
I Figure 2  about here1
Finally, P2 and PI, combined with P5, imply that in the interval of 
the e parameter defined by (12) and (7a) there exists an infinite 
number of positively sloped product supply curves. Some of these 
curves are depicted in figure 2, where MC and ATC respectively denote 
the marginal and the average total costs schedule.
VI. Summarry and Conclusions
In this paper we have defined an automatic transfer mechanism, coupled 
with the auctioneer organisation of the labour market, that improves 




























































































economies without modifying their institutional arrangements.
The basic effects created by its operation may be summarised as
follows.
f irst, it makes both the users and the suppliers of labour to react 
to variations in the centrally imposed calculated wage in the
qualitatively same way as they would respond to changes in the market 
wage in an entrepreneurial system. The calculated wage thus becomes an 
instrument which secures, through the auctioneer procedure, the
clearance of the labour market under worker-management.
Second, the mechanism generates an infinite number of positively 
sloped product supply curves available to the LMF which are, at least 
in the most relevant segment of the price region, less steep than the 
marginal costs schedule. This will reduce the inflationary pressures 
in a cooperative economy, which are likely to be lower than in
conventional entrepreneurial systems. At the same time the LMFs’
chances in the competition against PMFs will also be improved, due to 
their more flexible adaptation to demand shifts.
Further research is required to analyse the working of the scheme 
in the presence of adjustment costs, labour heterogeneity, or various 
monopolistic distortions. The impact of the mechanism on the risk 
shifting by a cooperative and on the allocative efficiency is also to 
be studied.
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1. If the earning differentials, caused by the mechanism, become a 
matter of concern, the f und could introduce a progressive tax on the 
dividend in excess of the calculated wage. The tax may also help to
cover possible deficits in the fu n d 's  budget, as the scheme does not 
have built in safeguards for keeping it balanced.
2. If this, however, occurs, one would have to dispense with the 
unique value of the e parameter for the regions of negative and
nonnegative profits.
3. In the presence of asymmetric information on the profit component 
of the dividend the argument presented below will hold a fortiori.
4. If the worker would not be better off after a relocation required
by P3, the question of his voluntary withdrawal will arise. A solution 
to the problem could be found in a one-time compensation negotiable by 
all interested parties. Another possible arrangement is to make a
distinction between the junior workers, both with the right and the 
duty to leave the cooperative first, and the senior ones, with the
privilege of no involuntary withdrawal but also with an obligation to
stay with the ailing firm until it is declared bankrupt. While the 
"must leave" rule is essentially a technical one and is intended to
enable the necessary short-run adjustments, the "must stay"
arrangement provides a basis for granting labour the control rights 





























































































F ig .  I :  The Collection of Demand for Labour Corves 




























































































I: i^. 2: The Collection of Product Supply Curves 
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